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THE BURDEN OF AMBIGUITY IN GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS
ROBERT J. SHERER*
There is much judicial comment indicating that when the federal
government enters into contracts with private parties it steps out of its
role as sovereign and becomes subject to the same rules of con-
tractual liability as those which govern dealings between private par-
ties.' However, when one disregards the cliches and examines the
realities, he discovers some fundamental differences inherent in the
relationship between the government and its contractors which the
latter can ill afford to overlook or ignore.
For example, the terms of a government contract are seldom the
product of negotiation between the parties. The basic document con-
stituting the contract (in which all else is incorporated by reference)
consists of a prescribed form' which no representative of the govern-
ment has the power to vary.' Even an actual, albeit inadvertent,
omission or variance from the prescribed form has been held to be
ineffective and the provisions of the prescribed form have been read
into the contract.' The rationale of such a result is that no repre-
sentative of the government has any authority to enter into a contract
in its behalf except in the form prescribed by statute or regulation.
One who would enter into a government contract must, therefore,
"accept or reject the contract as proffered, without haggling."'
Under such circumstances, one would expect those courts having
jurisdiction over controversies under government contracts' to apply
the familiar rule that any ambiguity in a written instrument will be
construed most strongly against the party responsible for the choice of
language.' In general, this has been the case, both in the courts' and
in the contracting agencies' own review boards' which exercise the
* B.S., M.A., LL.B. Boston College. Admitted to practice in Massachusetts in 1956.
With the firm of Roche & Leen, Boston, Mass., since 1957.
1
 Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); S.R.A., Inc. v. Minne-
sota, 327 U.S. 558 (1946); Century Indem. Co. v. United States, 236 F.2d 752 (D.C.
Cir. 1956).
2 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901 (1964).
3 Chalker & Lund Co. v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 381, 107 F. Supp. 734 (1952).
4 Southwestern Stamp Works, 60-1 BCA, ¶ 2653 (1960).
5
 WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874, 877 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
6
 The Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction where the amount in controversy
is in excess of $10,000. Cases involving a lesser amount may be brought either in the
Court of Claims or in a federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1958).
7 Garrison v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 688 (1868).
8 Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. United States, 109 Ct. Cl, 390 (1947).
9
 Northern Elec. Corp., 62 BCA ¶ 3494 (1962); Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 56-2
BCA	 1086 (1956).
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functions of the department head under the standard disputes clause.'
However, a recent line of cases first developed in the Court of
Claims" and apparently adopted by the review boards, 12
 indicates
that this time-honored rule of contract construction is subject to modi-
fication when applied to the field of government contracts. In these
cases, an escape hatch appears to have been found whereby the gov-
ernment may contractually relieve itself of the burden of ambiguity
in certain instances. The escape hatch is found in article 2 of the
standard form which provides:
The Contractor shall keep on the work a copy of the draw-
ings and specifications and shall at all times give the Con-
tracting Officer access thereto. Anything mentioned in the
specifications and not shown on the drawings or shown on
the drawings and not mentioned in the specifications, shall
be of Iike effect as if shown or mentioned in both. In case of
difference between drawings and specifications, the specifica-
tions shall govern. In case of discrepancy either in the figures,
in the drawings, or in the specifications, the matter shall be
promptly submitted to the Contracting Officer, who shall
promptly make a determination in writing. Any adjustment
10 In its current form, this clause provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute concerning
a question of fact arising under this contract which is not disposed of by agree-
ment shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision
to writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the Contractor. The
decision of the Contracting Officer shall be final and conclusive unless within 30
days from the date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor mails or otherwise
furnishes to the Contracting Officer written appeal addressed to the head of
the agency involved. The decision of the head of the agency or his duly
authorized representative for the determination of such appeals shall be final
and conclusive. This provision shall not be pleaded in any suit involving a
question of fact arising under this contract as limiting judicial review of any
such decision to cases where fraud by such official or his representative or hoard
is alleged: Provided, however, that any such decision shall be final and con-
clusive unless the same is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly
erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith or is not supported by substantial
evidence. In connection with any appeal proceeding under this clause, the
Contractor shall be afforded opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in
support of his appeal. Pending final decision on a dispute hereunder, the Con-
tractor shall proceed diligently with the performance of the contract and in
accordance with the Contracting Officer's decision.
(b) This Disputes clause does not preclude considerations of questions of
law in connection with decisions provided for in paragraph (a) above. Nothing
in this contract, however, shall be construed as making final the decision of any
administrative official, representative, or board on a question of law.
41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-23A (1964).
11 Beacon Constr. Co. v. United States, 314 F.2d 501 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Jefferson
Constr. Co. v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 75 (1960) ; Ring Constr. Corp. v. United States,
142 Ct. Cl. 731, 162 F. Supp. 190 (1958).
12 Daniel Constr. Co., 65-1 BCA 11 4540 (1965).
764
THE BURDEN OF AMBIGUITY
by the Contractor without such a determination shall be at
his own risk and expense. The Contracting Officer shall fur-
nish from time to time such detail drawings and other in-
formation as he may consider necessary, unless otherwise
provided.' (Emphasis supplied.)
While the above form is the product of several revisions in word-
ing beginning as far back as former Form 23 14 in 1942, the italicized
words have remained substantially the same. It is this language upon
which the Court of Claims based its decision in Beacon Constr. Co. v.
United States'' to deny relief to the contractor.
The Beacon case illustrates the risk to which a contractor ex-
poses himself in attempting to depend upon his own interpretation
of an ambiguous contract provision rather than bringing the am-
biguity to the attention of the contracting officer prior to bidding.
Relying on its own understanding of the housing contract under which
it was working as not requiring it to install weatherstrips on the win-
dows of the buildings, the contractor completed the project and saw it
accepted by the government without weatherstripping of the windows.
For all that appeared, the contractor's understanding was consistent
with that of the supervisory personnel of the contracting agency
which administered the contract for the government and accepted
the project. Several months later, after the buildings and their oc-
cupants had been exposed to the rigors of a Maine winter, it was "dis-
covered" that the weatherstrips had been omitted. The cost of having
them installed by another contractor was withheld from the original
contractor. The contracting officer's decision to withhold the funds
was upheld by the head of the department and suit was brought to
recover the withheld funds. The Court of Claims, while recognizing
that neither it nor the contractor was bound by the agency's con-
struction of the contract," nevertheless held that the contractor was
precluded from recovery by virtue of the provision in article 2 of the
contract quoted above, because of its failure, prior to bidding, to seek
a clarification from the contracting officer of a discrepancy in the
specifications. The court described this discrepancy as "patent and
gIaring." 17
On the same day, the Court of Claims decided Guyler v. United
States,' 8
 in which it allowed recovery for additional painting where
the contract specified "Interior exposed masonry surfaces [indicated
13
 41 C.F.R. § I-16.901-23A (1964).
14 41 U.S.C. (App.) § 54.13 (1958).
15 Supra note 11.
la Id. at 502.
17 ld. at 504.
19 314 F.2d 506 (Ct. CI. 1963).
765
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
on the drawings to be painted] shall be painted in accordance with the
attached Figure 1." The words in brackets were deleted by a modifica-
tion to which the parties had agreed. "Attached Figure I" did not
specify what surfaces were to be painted. The drawings showed the
walls in one room as painted black. The contractor contended that
he was only required to paint the masonry in that one room. A
majority of the Court of Claims ( Judge Whitaker dissented) agreed
with the contractor.
Judge Davis, who wrote the opinion in Beacon, wrote a concurring
opinion in Guyler, in which he distinguished Beacon on the following
basis:
(a) The discrepancy here, if one existed at all, was not of the
gross and patent character with which the Court is dealing
in Beacon ... but could, rather easily, be resolved by reading
the contract as a whole; (b) the possible ambiguity came to
light only after the contract was signed, not before it was
consummated; and (c) that ambiguity was obviously ap-
parent to the contracting officer prior to the time plaintiff
discovered it. In this case, accordingly, there was no breach
by the contractor of the requirements of Article 2. 10
A few months later, the court decided WPC Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States, "a study in the toils of ambiguity.''° The issue in this
case was whether five components of generator sets were required
by the contract to be manufactured by (or with the authority of)
certain named companies (as the government contended) or whether
the plaintiff could furnish identical components of other manufac-
turers at a lower price. The specifications gave general descriptions
without naming any manufacturer; the drawings, on the other hand,
showed the parts by the number given to each item by a named
manufacturer and declared that manufacturer to be the approved
source.
The court summed up the position of the parties in the following
language:
As with so many other agreements, there is something for
each party and no ready answer can be drawn from the
texts alone. Both plaintiff's and defendant's interpretations
lie within the zone of reasonableness; neither appears to rest
on an obvious error in drafting, a gross discrepancy, or an in-
advertent but glaring gap; the arguments, rather, are quite
closely in balance. It is precisely to this type of contract that
19 Id. at 510-11.
20
 323 F.2d 874, 875 (Ct. CI. 1963).
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this court has applied the rule that if some substantive provi-
sion of a government-drawn agreement is fairly susceptible
of a certain construction and the contractor actually and
reasonably so construes it, in the course of bidding or per-
formance, that is the interpretation which will be adopted—
unless the parties' intention is otherwise affirmatively re-
vealed."
Beacon and Guyler were distinguished with the following ex-
planation:
Although the potential contractor may have some duty to in-
quire about a major patent discrepancy, or obvious omission,
or a drastic conflict in provisions . . he is not normally
required (absent a clear warning in the contract) to seek
clarification of any and all ambiguities, doubts, or possible
differences in interpretation. . . . If the defendant chafes
under the continued application of this check . . . it can
shift the burden of ambiguity (to some extent) by inserting
provisions in the contract clearly calling upon possible con-
tractors aware of a problem-in-interpretation to seek an ex-
planation before bidding.' (Emphasis supplied.)
The clause in the contract which, in Beacon, was held to shift
the burden of ambiguity is a mandatory provision in a standard form.'
If, by the insertion of such a clause, the government has shifted the
burden of ambiguity in Beacon and those cases which purport to follow
it, it must be deemed to have done so in all contracts.
This, however, does not appear to be the case. From what was
said in Beacon, as well as in such earlier cases as Consolidated Eng'r
Co.,24 Ring Constr. Co.," and Jefferson Constr. Co.,' and in such
later cases as WPC,27 it seems that this rule may be invoked only
when the Court of Claims determines, on an ad hoc basis, that a
discrepancy or ambiguity was "patent," "glaring," or "obvious," or
whatever other epithet may be appropriately applied.
The disturbing feature about this rule is not that it requires the
contractor to make a careful examination of the contract documents
and call any discrepancies to the government's attention, but rather
that the consequence of his failure to make an inquiry or to discover
21 Id. at 876.
22 Id. at 877.
23 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-23A (1964).
24 Consolidated Eng'r Co. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 256 (1943).
25 Supra note 11.
26 Supra note 11.
27 Supra note 20.
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a discrepancy at the bidding stage appears to be a forfeiture of any
right subsequently to challenge in the courts an adverse determination
by the contracting officer in interpreting the disputed specification.
The Wunderlich Act" outlaws any clause in a government contract
making the decision of a contracting officer final on a question of law.
The intent of Congress appears clear that, as to questions of law
arising under a government contract, the parties are entitled to a judi-
cial, rather than merely an administrative determination. The lesson
of Beacon and of those cases which follow it, however, appears to be
that, where a bidder (who subsequently becomes the contractor) fails
to make a pre-bid inquiry as to the interpretation of a "patent and
glaring discrepancy," the court will refuse to consider the merits as
to the correct interpretation of the contract even where "as a matter
of pure contract-construction, there is something to be said for both
sides.
 :729
As applied by the departmental review boards, the rule makes
the contracting officer's decision on a dispute of law unreviewable even
within the department under the framework of the "disputes" clause. 30
The moral is clear, as stated in Ring, that "a bidder should call
attention to an obvious omission in a specification and make certain
the omission was deliberate, if he intends to take advantage of it." 31
What is less clear is the point at which the Court of Claims will decide
that an omission was so obvious that it should abrogate its judicial
functions and defer to the determination of the contracting officer.
28 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. § 322 (1958).
29 Beacon Constr. Co. v. United States, supra note 11, at 503.
30
 Daniel Constr. Co., supra note 12,
31
 Ring Constr. Corp. v. United States, supra note 11, at 734, 162 F. Supp. at 192.
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